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Considering Murphy on Human Executioners 
Christopher Bennett 
 
I am very grateful to Jeffrie Murphy for his response to my paper1 and to Jonathan Jacobs for 
WKHFKDQFHWRUHVSRQGLQWXUQWR0XUSK\¶VFULWLFLVPV,WLVDSDUWLFXODUhonor for me to 
respond to Jeffrie Murphy, whose inspiring writings on retribution, the emotions, and human 
interaction I have long admired and taken as a guiding point for my own work. No excuses, 
however: I do not mean to attribute the weaknesses in the paper under discussion to 
MXUSK\¶VLQIOXHQFH or to curry favor. Murphy places some significant charges at my door; in 
what follows I re-state his target as I understand it, and then examine whether my argument 
has the resources to meet his criticisms. 
 
Capital Punishment and the Virtuous Executioner 
In the original paper I argued that new light could be shed on the old arguments about capital 
punishment if we consider them from the perspective of the executioner. In particular, I 
argued that a successful theory of capital punishment VKRXOGSURYLGHD³JHQHUDOMXVWLI\LQJ
DLP´RQZKLFKDQH[HFXWLRQHUFRXOGDFWDQGVWLOOEHDYLUWXRXVDJHQW,QGUDZLQJVRPH
conclusions about where this desideratum would take us, I made some assumptions about 
ZKDWWKH³YLUWXRXVH[HFXWLRQHU´ZRXOGEHOLNH First of all, I assumed that the virtuous 
executioner will not simply take his social role for granted, but will ask questions about 
whether it is a job in which he can take pride. That is, an executioner who wants to do his job, 
not simply as a source of LQFRPHEXWDVDFUDIWZKRZDQWVWRFRQWULEXWHKLVOLIH¶VZRUNWR
some worthwhile enterprise, should be able to find in this general justifying aim the basis of a 
satisfying vocation. Secondly, I assumed that the virtuous agent has a standing commitment 
to interacting with people in a certain way that I ± perhaps not very helpfully ± labeled 
³KXPDQLQWHUDFWLRQ´7KLVDVVXPSWLRQLQYROYHGWZRLQWHUUHODWHGSRLQWV2QWKHRQHKDQGWKDW
it is part of virtue in the carrying out of any role that one is capable of treating those for 
ZKRPRQHLVUHVSRQVLEOHQRWVLPSO\DV³WKHQH[WFDVH´EXWDVSRVVHVVLQJDNLQGRI
individuality (and that one has some insight into what makes them individuals) ± that this 
capability is part of what it is to see them as human. And, on the other hand, that one carry 
RXWRQH¶VUROHLQDZD\WKDWGRHVMXVWLFHWRWKHGLVWLQFWLYHO\KXPDQFDSDFLWLHVRIWKRVHZLWK
whom one deals, so that they cannot walk away from the interaction thinking that they were 
simply treated as animals or as numbers or as obstacles: for instance by engaging them in 
very basic but distinctively human practices such as making requests of them, awaiting their 
responses, engaging in the back-and-forth of address and response. These points are 
interrelated since it seems to be a mark of individuality that one can be engaged in address 
DQGUHVSRQVHWKHLQWHUDFWLRQ,DPFRQFHUQHGZLWKLVQRWVRPHWKLQJRQHFDQKDYHZLWKRQH¶V
computer operating system, however informative it might be. Thus the general justifying aim 
should be something that the executioner can carry into interactions with those for whom he 
is responsible, and offer to them as a justification for the way his job requires him to treat 
them, while at the same time maintaining his attitude to them as individual subjects of 
address and response.  
I then argued that some justifications of capital punishment fall foul of this 
desideratum. I was concerned in particular about the Social Control model that sees capital 
punishment as justified for reasons of incapacitation or general deterrence: though I also 
argued that my favored interpretation of retributivism ± the redemptive conception that sees 
punishment as atonement ± would need to do some work to establish that only death can be 
proportionate atonement for certain wrongs. I argued that the Social Control model takes it 
WKDWWKHGHFLVLYHUHDVRQVWRHQGVRPHRQH¶VOLIHDUHUHDVRQVRIVRFLDOHIILFLHQF\DQGWKDWZH
can better see the deficiency in this justification if we think of the psychology of a virtuous 
executioner attempting to act on this justification while also looking at his craft as a source of 
pride, and treating those in his care as individuals. The deficiency emerges, it seemed to me, 
as we imagine the virtuous executioner trying to reconcile his role-obligation to treat reasons 
of social efficiency as decisive reasons to execute a particular criminal (this is not strictly 
speaking a role-obligation; nevertheless, I take it that this captures the attitude of someone 
who sees his serving the institution of social control as a matter of pride), with his standing 
commitment to do justice to the individuality he can see in each person. My underlying 
thought was that the Social Control model of punishment has to see people as capable of 
being substituted one for another, so that the extinction of one person can be compensated for 
± and more ± by the fact that others are thereby made better off; and that this perspective is 
difficult to reconcile with appreciating and honoring individuality. In advancing this view, I 
adapted longstanding objections to consequentialist accounts of punishment that have been 
put forward by Hegel, Duff and others. My own contribution was simply meant to put these 
objections in a new light by asking us to think about making social control reasons our own if 
we were in the position of carrying out an execution ± though I also put forward the view 
that, as a question of moral epistemology, or the deep normative structure of moral theories, 
our basic grasp of the moral landscape may come when we are thinking imaginatively and 
vividly about what it would be like to actually act on a given set of reasons in a reasonably 
concrete situation.  
 
The Social Control Model 
Murphy describes my characterizDWLRQRIWKH6RFLDO&RQWUROYLHZDV³VRFUXGHand distorting 
WKDWDQ\UHDVRQDEOHSHUVRQZRXOGUHMHFWLW´2 It is not the case, he thinks, that all social control 
theorists recommend treating a person as a piece of social garbage to be disposed of. For 
instance, any social control theorist can recognize that there are values in play in addition to 
those that require execution, values which may require the offender to be treated as a human 
being; and that, anyway, the offender will have undergone a process of investigation and trial 
that involves accountability and not simply social hygiene. I agree of course that social 
control theorists can recognize side-constraints and the necessity of a trial. In that sense 
capital punishment for reasons of deterrence or incapacitation is not like disposing of 
garbagH1HYHUWKHOHVV,GRQ¶WWKLQNWKDWZLWKWKLVFULWLFLVP0XUSK\KDVDGGUHVVHGWKHKHDUW
of the issue. My point concerns what it is like to treat social efficiency reasons for capital 
punishment as decisive at the point at which one is physically involved in executing an 
offender. Of course there may be many other reasons in play, but my question regards what it 
is like not to see those other reasons as defeating the claims of social efficiency to justify 
execution. To see reasons of social efficiency as decisive one must see the offender in a 
certain light ± as a being capable of being substituted by others; I claim that by looking at the 
experience of the executioner who is capable of recognizing the offender as a distinctive 
individual and potential participant in a range of interactions, we can see how hard it is to 
reconcile the decisiveness of social efficiency with the spirit of the side-constraints: 
Individual preciousness as manifested in interpersonal interaction on the one hand, 
substitutability on tKHRWKHU7KXV0XUSK\LVFRUUHFWWRSRLQWRXWWKDWP\³WUHDWLQJDV
JDUEDJH´FODLPLVQRWOLWHUDOO\WUXH%XWOLNH+HJHO¶V³UDLVLQJDVWLFNWRDGRJ´,WDNHLWWKDW
the comparison is really meant to shed light on the fact that the Social Control view is 
incompatible with doing full justice to what makes someone human.  
In my paper I acknowledged that a full argument against the Social Control view 
would have to deal with recent attempts to argue that punishment can be employed as a form 
of defense and should therefore be assimilated to the norms of self-defense and war.3 ,GLGQ¶W
attempt to provide a full reckoning with this view, but I did argue for a moral difference 
between killing in war and killing through execution. Even though the aim in both cases may 
be the justifiable one of preventing harm and death to innocents, it makes a difference that 
when we punish our aim is to impose harm, whereas in defense the aim is to prevent it, using 
force only if necessary. In a footnote, Murphy questions this distinction, arguing that it is a 
corrupt use of the doctrine of double effect to DWWHPSWWRGLVWLQJXLVKEHWZHHQ³ZKDWWKHDJHQW
LVDLPLQJDW´ in this way, and giving examples of soldiers (such as the sniper) who 
presumably must have the settled intention to kill in order to do their job successfully.4 
1HYHUWKHOHVVLWGRHVVHHPLPSRUWDQWWKDWWKHVROGLHU¶VPRWLYDWLRQDOVWUXFWXUHVKRXOGEH
FRQGLWLRQDOLQDZD\WKDWWKHH[HFXWLRQHU¶VQHHGQRWZKHUHDVWKHH[HFXWLRQHUFDQKDYHD
settled aim despite the fact that his target currently poses no threat, it at least makes sense for 
the soldier to continue to review whether force is necessary until the last point at which the 
decision can be made. It is important, therefore, that in defense, killing is a last resort, 
whereas in punishment some sense of fittingness to the crime is required, which means that 
the appropriateness of killing has already been determined. If this difference in the norms 
relevant to defense and punishment can be maintained, we can distinguish two versions of the 
³defense´ form of the Social Control model: one on which something that really qualifies as 
punishment is used for the purposes of defense, and another on which punishment is 
effectively abolished and replaced with an institution of defense. The second is the more 
radical, but also the simpler, since it accepts no reasons for inflicting harm that do not stem 
from necessity and proportionality in prevention; whereas the first invites the question of how 
these aims could be harmonized, given that punishment settles the question earlier than can 
be justified for purposes of defense. If this suggests thaWWKHDEROLWLRQLVWIRUPRIWKH³defense´ 
view is the more promising of the two, it also suggests that it can only be successful if we 
have a reason to abolish punishment. If, on the contrary, we do have some grounds for 
retaining punishment, say as an important form of accountability, abolishing it would leave 
us treating offenders only as if they were to be defended against, and not as though they were 
accountable. If this position seems unacceptable, it may be that one of the strongest 
arguments against the Social Control model generally is that it aspires to exclude or replace 
what should be the most salient response to wrongdoers, that is, an accountability-based 
response. 
 
Professional Technique 
Murphy interprets me as saying that Pierrepoint is concerned only with efficient professional 
technique, and not with wider values that might inform the nature and use of that technique. 
He points out that Pierrepoint was indeed concerned with the sanctity of life and thus 
criticizes me for overlooking this fact. However, I think this is a misunderstanding of my 
YLHZRQ0XUSK\¶VSDUW± a misunderstanding arising from the lack of clarity in my original 
preVHQWDWLRQRIWKHSRLQW7KHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQRI3LHUUHSRLQW¶VSURIHVVLRQDOLVPfor which 
Murphy criticizes me is only one of three that I put forward, and one that I acknowledge 
P\VHOIWREHLQVXIILFLHQWWRH[SODLQ3LHUUHSRLQW¶VFRQGXFWDQGDWWLWXGHV± the other two 
FRQFHUQWKHZD\LQZKLFK3LHUUHSRLQW¶VSURIHVVLRQDOLVPLQWHUDFWVZLWKKLVUHFHSWLYLW\WRZLGHU
YDOXHV,DJUHHYHU\PXFKZLWK0XUSK\WKDWLWLV3LHUUHSRLQW¶VRSHQQHVVWRTXHVWLRQVDERXW
the wider basis of his professionalism that make his testimony about being an executioner so 
insightful and worthy of consideration. 
 
Punishment as Retributive Redemption 
As Murphy points out, I see the retributive model of redemption through atonement as more 
likely to provide Pierrepoint with the satisfying justification he seeks; this on the grounds that 
I understand the call and response of demands for atonement and their fulfillment as taking 
place within the field of human interaction rather than as requiring its suspension. However, 
Murphy makes two criticisms of my presentation. Firstly, he takes issue with my 
interpretation of what it is to treat someone as an end in herself, arguing that my 
interpretation, which he thiQNVUHTXLUHVXVWRHQJDJHLQD³ULFK´ range of interactions with one 
another, sets the bar too high, and that his (perfectly virtuous, as it sounds to me) interactions 
with his students fail to meet it. And secondly, he DUJXHVWKDW,PD\EHJXLOW\RI³FRORVVDOO\´ 
begging the question, since the range of interactions I discuss require that the person be alive, 
thus providing a very quick and easy argument DJDLQVWWKHGHDWKSHQDOW\DQG³making the rest 
of [my] complex essay unnecessary.´5 On the first point, Murphy is right that we are not 
engaged in an argument about Kant scholarship; we are rather engaged in arguing about how 
best to understand the intuition (insight?) that Kant found compelling. However, for the 
argument on this latter point to be fair, I need to point out that Murphy has misquoted me. 
The relevant SDVVDJHLQWKHRULJLQDOVD\V³appreciating someone as an end in herself involves 
being confronted by her reality as a potential participant in a range of valuable and fulfilling 
LQWHUDFWLRQV´ (my italics, designating the words Murphy omits). This qualification is 
important because the omitted words in the original passage are there to stress that the 
requirement to treat someone as an end does not mean a requirement actually to engage with 
her in the range of activities I then go on to list (and which Murphy quotes). If it did, it would 
indeed look overly demanding. Rather, I have in mind the thought that an essential part of 
what is involved in someone having moral status as an end in herself is for her to have the 
kind of phenomenological presence and depth that arises when one is seen as the kind of 
being with whom one could have various rich interactions. I take it that Murphy, in giving his 
lectures, does view his students as the kinds of beings who are capable of engaging in the 
activities I mention, and that he directs his conduct and attitudes to them on the basis that 
they do have the corresponding depth and presence. This point also shows that I do not beg 
the question by running the quick and easy argument Murphy has in mind. If what we were 
required to do were to interact with people in certain ways, then, I agree, it would be 
impermissible to put them to death; but if what morality requires is rather that we do justice 
to their identity as potential participants in a range of valuable interactions and to their 
possession of the capacities that such interaction requires and expresses, the question of 
whetKHULWLVFRPSDWLEOHZLWKVXFK³GRLQJMXVWLFH´ to put someone to death seems to me still 
open. 
 
Conclusion 
0XUSK\DUJXHVWKDW3LHUUHSRLQW¶VUHDOUHDVRQIRUGLVLOOXVLRQDERXWKLVYocation was not his 
inability to justify capital punishment ± disillusion that Murphy thinks is not called for ± but 
his being at the mercy of demands of popularity and influence that were contrary to the 
integrity of the role as he saw it. I agree that these considerations ± as well as the 
considerations Murphy mentions about the structural, institutional biases and cruelties in the 
penal system ± might undermine the capacity of morally sensitive individuals to take pride in 
their work in such an institution. But as I have tried to explain, I also believe that 
3LHUUHSRLQW¶VH[SHULHQFHVGRLOOXPLQDWHWKHFDVHDJDLQVWFDSLWDOSXQLVKPHQW,UHJUHWQRW
having convinced Murphy on this score; I would be happy, however, at least to have 
furthered the conversation. 
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